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Abstract
In this paper we study the optimal ex-ante merger policy in a model where merger
proposals are the result of strategic bargaining among alternative candidates. We allow for
firm asymmetries and, in particular, we emphasize the fact that potential synergies generated
by a merger may vary substantially depending on the identity of the participating firms. The
model demonstrates that, under some circumstances, relatively inefficient mergers may take
place. That is, a particular merger may materialize despite the existence of an alternative
merger capable of generating higher social surplus and even higher profits. Such bargaining
failures have important implications for the ex-ante optimal merger policy. We show that
a more stringent policy than the ex-post optimal reduces the scope of these bargaining
failures and raises expected social surplus. We use a bargaining model that is flexible, in the
sense that its strategic structure does not place any exogenous restriction on the endogenous
likelihood of feasible mergers.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we study merger policy in a model where merger proposals arise endogenously as
the outcome of strategic bargaining. We allow for firm asymmetries so that the identity of the
merging partners affects the distribution of surplus. In particular, we emphasize the fact that
potential synergies generated by a merger may vary substantially depending on the identity of
the participating firms.
We make two points. First, we show that relatively inefficient mergers may arise endoge-
nously. Merger policy is typically passive; that is, authorities restrict themselves to approve or
reject the merger proposal that has been submitted. In this scenario, a particular merger may
materialize despite the existence of an alternative merger capable of generating larger synergies
and hence higher profits and consumer surplus. Second, we show that commitment to an ex-ante
merger policy that is more stringent than the ex-post optimal policy can alleviate the negative
consequences of such bargaining failures.
We use a specific non-cooperative bargaining protocol that treats all firms symmetrically and
is very flexible. In particular, its strategic structure does not place any exogenous restriction on
the endogenous likelihood of feasible mergers. Moreover, it generates a unique prediction.1
We study an abstract industry model that encompasses several standard models of oligopoly.
As usual, merger policy focuses on the trade-off between market power and cost efficiencies. The
benchmark model considers three firms. In isolation these firms are symmetric. Only two-firm
mergers can generate synergies, hence a merger to monopoly will never be authorized. However,
different mergers may generate different levels of synergy. In every period firms compete in the
market place and also bargain about the possibility of submitting a merger proposal, if one has
not been put forward to date. Once an agreement is reached, the market structure shifts from
triopoly to duopoly for all future periods. Different pairs of firms can exploit different synergies
by merging, and so different reductions in marginal costs. We focus on a scenario where any
merger resulting in prices that are lower than in the status quo will be profitable and attractive
for the firms involved. That is, the profits of the merged firm are higher than the sum of profits
of the merging firms in the status quo, and all firms prefer to be part of a merger rather than
be left out of the deal. In this case, it is not surprising that if a consumer surplus enhancing
merger exists then firms always reach an agreement immediately. However, the issue is whether
the bargaining process will select the most profitable and/or efficient merger. We show that
1Our protocol asymptotically implements a new solution concept for cooperative games that we have developed
elsewhere (Burguet and Caminal, 2011)
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whenever all three mergers would pass the merger review, then the most efficient merger will be
proposed with probability one only if the cost efficiencies of alternative mergers are sufficiently
lower. Otherwise, in the unique equilibrium of our model all feasible mergers occur with positive
probability. All firms in such equilibrium are indifferent about their merging partners and as a
result any pair may actually arise as a successful merger.
We assume that competition authorities are able to commit ex-ante to a certain approval
rule. The authorities’ goal is to maximize consumer surplus and they can perfectly monitor the
level of synergies that the merger under review would generate. Hence, ex-post (at the moment
of reviewing a specific merger proposal) the best merger policy is to accept a merger if and only
if it reduces market prices. However, when bargaining failures are possible, making the approval
rule more stringent than the optimal ex-ante policy causes two countervailing effects. On the
one hand, it precludes some consumer-surplus enhancing mergers. On the other hand, it reduces
the probability that the most efficient merger is destabilized by alternative, less efficient ones. If
the deviation from the ex-post optimal rule is small, then the former negative effect is of second
order, since foregone increases in consumer surplus are also small, but the latter positive effect
is of first order. Therefore, the optimal ex-ante policy is always more stringent than the ex-post
optimal policy.
The benchmark model describes the implications of alternative market structures using
reduced-forms. Both the model and the main results are presented in Section 2. In Section
3 we provide foundations for the reduced forms, showing that some standard oligopoly models
fit perfectly in the framework studied in the previous section.
In Section 4 we take a step in extending the analysis to n firms by considering the case where
an industry is initially populated by four identical firms, although again only bilateral merg-
ers can generate synergies. With four firms, two consequtive mergers may maximize consumer
surplus, and hence the merger review process may become truly dynamic. The analysis is more
complex and bargaining failures may take new forms. However, the insights of the three-firm
case largely apply. The dynamic nature of policy becomes an issue, but a more stringent merger
policy still alleviates the negative consequences of bargaining failures.
In Section 5 we relax the assumption that authorities can perfectly monitor the level of
synergies. Instead, we assume that authorities can only observe a noisy signal, whose quality
depends on the effort exerted by the firms applying for merger. In other words, firms are given the
possibility of an efficiency defense, the chance to document their claims about the efficiencies
that the merger may generate. However, they are required to sustain those claims with a
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minimum degree of accuracy. A merger rule then includes two instruments: (i) the minimum
level of synergies that must be documented and (ii) the quality of the evidence backing the
claim. A higher required quality makes monitoring mistakes less frequent and by imposing a
higher cost on the merger, also discourages proposals with relatively small synergies. We show
that, as in the benchmark case, the presence of bargaining failures induces a more stringent rule
with respect to the threshold level of synergies required. The effect on the required quality level
is less clear. Bargaining failures reduce the average efficiency gains of mergers, and hence the
social return from a more accurate monitoring technology is lower. In this sense, bargaining
failures diminish the authorities’ incentive to demand more extensive information gathering
efforts. However, given the existence of these bargaining failures, a higher quality requirement
helps reducing competition from relatively inefficient mergers, just as in the benchmark model.
A final Section 6 contains conclusions and comments on several additional issues.
Our paper is closely related to three different strands of the literature: endogenous mergers,
optimal merger approval rules, and non-cooperative bargaining.
Many studies have focused on how mergers are endogenously determined. This literature
typically ignores merger control. Some authors (Barros, 1998; and Horn and Persson, 2001)
have approached the problem using cooperative solution concepts for games in partition function
form, since a merger creates externalities on non-merging firms. Other authors (Kamien and
Zang, 1990; Gowrisankaran, 1999; Inderst and Wey, 2004; Fridolffson and Stennek, 2005a; and
Nocke and Whinston, 2011) have set up non-cooperative games where both the market structure
and the division of surplus are determined simultaneously. In some of these models there are
restrictions on the subsets of firms that can participate in a merger. For example, Inderst and
Wey (2004) assume that there is an exogenously designated target and in Nocke and Whinston
(2011) nature selects one of the firms as the acquirer. In a similar spirit, Gowrisankaran (1999)
assumes that the largest firm is the only one that can acquire a smaller firm. Hence, these
studies fail to contemplate the possibility that each member of, say, a three-firm group considers
merging with each of the other two, which is a crucial ingredient in the emergence of bargaining
failures.2 In other studies, these restrictions on the feasible merger combinations are not imposed,
but all mergers are assumed symmetric and/or their non-cooperative games produce multiple
2 In some real world situations a particular firm (perhaps, in financial distress) may appair as the natural target.
This was the case, for instance, in the Nestlé-Perrier case following the ’benzene scandal’, where Nestlé and the
Agnelli’s group competed to acquire the troubled French company. In other situations the industry may require
an increase in concentration, but a priori all possible subsets could sensibly attempt a cost-reducing merger. A
recent example is the US airlines industry. Before announcing their merger with Continental in 2010, United had
been reported negotiating with US Airways. Moreover, the press speculated about almost all possible bilateral
mergers involving these three firms plus American.
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equilibrium outcomes (Kamien and Zang, 1990; and Fridolffson and Stennek, 2005a).3
The literature on optimal merger approval rules can be traced back to Besanko and Spulber
(1993). In this research line, the paper closest to ours is Nocke and Whinston (2011). We
borrow from them the specification of the merger review and, moreover, our results on the
optimal merger rule are analogous to theirs, although emerging from different mechanisms.4
They study a Cournot model with endogenous determination of merger proposals where one
firm is exogenously selected to be the proposer. As in our paper, more stringent rules may
serve to induce mergers which cause a higher increase in consumer surplus. They show that
the larger the change in the (naively computed) Herfindhal index caused by the merger, the
more stringent the optimal ex-ante rule is. In their paper, bargaining failures are ruled out
by the merger selection mechanism. The ex-ante optimal merger rule differs from the ex-post
optimal one in order to compensate for a misalignment between private and public incentives
(profits versus consumer surplus). In contrast, in ours the preferred merger from the point of
view of consumer surplus is also preferred from the point of view of industry profits, but no
selection mechanism prevents the success of other, less attractive merger proposals. Nocke and
Whinston allow for ex-ante asymmetric firms, and so the merger rule can be conditional on the
ex-ante size of applicants, which renders a nice relationship between optimal stringency and the
concentration index typically used in merger policy. Instead, we abstract from this asymmetry
and focus on the differences in efficiency gains resulting from alternative mergers. As discussed
in the last section, the insights from the two papers are complementary.
The merger problem we take up in this paper is similar (and equivalent, for some parameter
values) to what has been termed the three-person/three-cake problem (see, for instance, Bin-
more, 1985), or in general a (restricted) game of coalition formation. Non cooperative analyses
of this sort of problems abound, most using one version or another of a dynamic proponent-
respondent game in the Rubinstein-Stahl tradition. (See Ray, 2007, for a general discussion
including games with externalities, and Compte and Jehiel, 2010, for a recent example.) Our
contribution in this strand is to propose a game designed so that the ordering of proposers is
endogenous. That is, the agreed outcome is not a consequence of any arbitrary order of propos-
als: on the contrary, both order and outcome, are jointly determined by the primitives of the
bargaining problem.5
3Kamein and Zang (1990) assume that each firm simoultaneously sets an asking price and bids for each of the
other firms. Much closer to our modeling approach, Fridolffson and Stennek (2005a) set up a dynamic bargaining
game, which will be discussed below.
4Our discussion of dynamic merger policy (Section 4) is also related to Motta and Vasconcelos (2005) and
Nocke and Whinston (2010).
5 If the ordering of proposers and movements, random or deterministic, is exogenous, we should agree with Ray
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2 The benchmark model
We consider an industry where firms compete with each other but also bargain about the possi-
bility of submitting a merger proposal. We embed bargaining and competition in a dynamic but
stationary setting. First, merger opportunities, i.e., potential synergies, do not evolve with time.
Second, we restrict ourselves to "stationary" equilibria, so that firms’ strategies do not depend
on history. This latter assumption means that firms, on the one hand, do not adhere to what
could be considered as collusive behavior (and as a result they repeatedly play the equilibrium
strategies of the static competition game) and on the other hand, when bargaining they ignore
past moves. In this benchmark model we take a reduced form approach about the distributional
implications of alternative market structures.
Time is a discrete variable indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, ... (infinite horizon). At the beginning of
the game there are three identical firms: 1, 2, 3. The following sequence of moves takes place in
period 0:
a) Competition authorities announce a rule for approving mergers that will remain fixed
forever (full commitment).
b) Firms, but not authorities, learn about the synergies that can be exploited in case of
a merger. Different pairs of firms may enjoy different reductions in marginal costs. All firms
become perfectly informed about the marginal costs that would result from all possible mergers.
Only two-firm mergers generate synergies and as a result authorities will never allow a merger to
monopoly. Thus, there are only two possible market structures: the initial triopoly or a duopoly
where the merged firm competes with the stand alone firm.
c) The three firms bargain about the possible submission of a merger proposal. They ne-
gotiate bilaterally within a protocol specified below. If two firms agree on submitting a merger
proposal, authorities will learn the cost of the merged firm, and approve the merger if and only
if it complies with the announced rule.
d) If no merger has been authorized then the triopoly game is played in the market; otherwise,
the duopoly game is played.
In all subsequent periods, if a merger was successful in the past then the existing firms keep
playing the duopoly game. If no merger proposal was ever submitted, firms again engage in
bargaining, followed by competition.
Authorities are assumed to maximize the expected present value of consumer surplus, and
(2007, page 140) in that “a theory that purports to yield solutions that are independent of proposer ordering is
suspect”.
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this appears to be what goes on in the real world. Both firms and competition authorities
discount the future at the rate r. We will focus on the case that r is arbitrarily small, so that
the friction built in the bargaining protocol is also arbitrarily small.
2.1 Static competition in a nutshell
The effect of synergies on the distribution of profits and consumer welfare will be represented
by exogenous functions. In Section 3 we provide foundations for such reduced forms.
The three initial firms have access to the same constant returns to scale technology and hence
face the same marginal cost c0. The equilibrium level of profits of a single firm under triopoly
is denoted by π0, and the level of consumer surplus by CS0.
Any pair of firms incurs a sunk cost for merging, F , the same for all pairs, although the
synergies that each pair can exploit are different. For most of the paper we will simplify the
analysis by setting F = 0. If firms i and j merge the constant marginal cost of the new firm is
denoted by cij . As a notational convention firms 1 and 2 are the partners to the most efficient
and profitable merger. Of course, in making this convention, we must assume the identity of
the firms is common knowledge among firms, but ignored by authorities. For simplicity, we
also assume that the other two mergers are symmetric; i.e., c13 = c23 ≥ c12. We thus assume
that from the authorities’ point of view (c12, c13) are random variables distributed according
to the density function h (c12, c13) that has no mass points and takes strictly positive values
on C ≡ {(c12, c13) | 0 ≤ c12 ≤ c0, c12 ≤ c13 ≤ c}, but h (c12, c13) = 0, if (c12, c13) /∈ C. Also for
simplicity, we restrict attention to the case that approval rules take the form of a threshold
value, c. Thus, at the beginning of the game authorities announce a cut-off, c, and commit to
approve a merger proposal if and only if the marginal cost of the merged firm is lower than c.6
Let us now consider the duopoly game. Suppose a merger between firms i and j, with
marginal cost cij , has been approved. Then the merged firm faces a stand alone firm, k, with
marginal cost c0. Obviously, i, j, k represent generic, different firms. Profits of the merged firm
and stand alone firm are denoted by πij (cij) and πk (cij), respectively. Consumer surplus is
denoted by CS (cij). The following assumptions will be derived from first principles in the next
section:
(A.1) There exists a value of the marginal cost of the merged firm, cn, 0 < cn < c0, such
that CS (cn) = CS0. Moreover, CS (cij) is a continuously differentiable function with dCSdcij < 0.
Hence, a merger increases consumer surplus if and only if cij ≤ cn.
6Nocke and Whinston (2011) discuss in detail the optimality of cutoff policies in a related setup.
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(A.2) πij (cij) is continuously differentiable with
dπij
dcij
< 0. Moreover, πij (cn) > 2π0. Hence,
any merger that is socially desirable is also profitable for the merging firms.
(A.3) πk (cij) is continuously differentiable with dπkdcij > 0. Moreover, πk (cn) = π0. Hence,
any merger that is socially desirable is detrimental to the stand alone firm.
In imposing (A.3) we implicitly assume that for all cij > 0 the stand alone firm, k, remains
active. In the models reviewed in Section 3 there may exist a positive value of cij , denoted by
cM , such that πk (cij) = 0 for all cij ≤ cM . In other words, cM is the threshold below which the
stand alone firm is ejected from the market and the merged firm becomes a monopolist. We will
ignore this possibility, which does not affect the qualitative results but would only lengthen the
presentation.
Since we focus for the moment on the case c ≤ cn, these assumptions imply a feasible merger
is not only profitable but also attractive. That is, all mergers that would be authorized promise
a level of profits for the merged firm that exceeds the joint profits in the status quo. Moreover,
all firms prefer to be part of a merger rather than standing alone. Under these conditions
we can confidently expect that in equilibrium a merger occurs immediately with probability
one. Beyond this unsurprising aggregate outcome, we emphasize the possibility that the merger
proposal that arises in equilibrium is neither the most efficient nor the most profitable.
For a given realization of (c12, c13), we denote by π12, π3 the respective profits when the
efficient merger takes place, and by π13 (= π23), π1 (= π2) the profits when one of the less efficient
merger materializes. Thus, these four numbers, π12, π13, π1, π3, are the crucial parameters of the
bargaining game. If cij ≤ cn, from assumptions (A.2) and (A.3): 12π12 ≥
1
2π13 > π0 ≥ π1 ≥ π3.
Finally we assume:
(A.4) Aggregate profits under the efficient merger are higher than under those less efficient;
i.e., π12 + π3 ≥ π13 + π1.
According to (A.4), private and social goals are aligned as far as the ranking of mergers is
concerned. In fact, this assumption is not important for predicting the outcome of the bargaining
process. Its significance is that it does clarify the nature of the bargaining failures and hence
the main argument behind the characteristics of the ex-ante optimal policy.
2.2 The bargaining game
We model firms’ bargaining as a game that is repeated in each period until an agreement is
reached. There are two elements to any agreement, and so too for any terminal outcome of
the protocol: the identity of the merging firms, and the division of the surplus resulting from
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the merger. Thus, in each period the protocol first allows firms to endogenously select the
negotiating partners, and then allows those partners to discuss the realization of the merger and
the division of the corresponding surplus. The first part of the protocol is as follows:
Selection of negotiating partners
(1) Nature selects one of the three firms, each with probability 13 . Let that firm be A.
(2) Firm A invites one of the other two firms to become its negotiation partner. Let us call
it firm B.
(3) Firm B accepts or rejects. If it accepts then firms (A,B) enter into the negotiation stage.
If firm B rejects then firms (B,C) enter into the negotiation stage.
The second part, negotiations between either (A,B) or (B,C) (let (F,E) represent in general
that pair of firms), could be modeled in a variety of equivalent ways and we choose the simplest.
Actual negotiation between F and E.
(4) Nature selects one of the two firms, each with probability 12 . Let that firm be F .
(5) Firm F makes an offer to firm E: θEF , understood as the per-period profits that E retains
if merged with F .
(6) Firm E accepts or rejects F ’s offer. If E accepts then it gets θEF per period (
1+r
r θ
E
F
discounted total payoff), firm F gets πFE − θEF (
¡
πFE − θEF
¢
1+r
r discounted total payoff) and
the bargaining ends. If E rejects the offer then all firms obtain the equilibrium profits of the
triopoly game in that period and bargaining is resumed in the next period.
Points (1) to (6) describe the timing of the perfect information stage-game played in each
period until an agreement is reached. (See Figure 1.) The protocol is simple and flexible.7
Perhaps its most novel feature is step (3). This minor complication with respect to standard
protocols is what makes our protocol sufficiently flexible: crucially, by introducing it, nature’s
choice in step (1) does not impose upper or lower bounds on the probability that any given firm
is part of a successful merger in any given period. For example, this would not be the case if we
instead assumed that in node (3), if firm B rejects the offer then the game moves to the next
period, or assumed that then firm A can still ask firm C. In that case, a negotiation between
firms B and C would be impossible in that period. We elaborate on alternative specifications
7Note that we could have added a trivial possibility in (3): that firm C rejects being part of the negotaitions
with B, and then the game moves to the next period without agreement. Without adding this possibility, firm
C can always reject any offer in (6) if it becomes firm E, and make an offer that will be rejected for sure, if
it is firm E. Thus any equilibrium outcome in the extended game where that option is played with positive
probability would be also an equilibrium outcome of our game. We can also argue that nothing would change
by adding yet another possibility, that firm C rejects firm B’s invitation and instead invites firm A. The key is
that: 1) any (equilibrium) probability distribution over the three possible pairs in the extended protocol can be
obtained with (mixed) strategies in the protocol proposed here; and, 2) with the same continuation strategies for
the negotiations stage, those strategies would also be equilibria in our protocol.
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below.
We focus on subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPE) in stationary strategies and are inter-
ested in situations with negligible bargaining friction. Thus, we will state results for the limit
of equilibria as r → 0. A stationary strategy for a firm in this game includes a probability
distribution over the two potential invitees in step (2) in case the firm is chosen by nature in
step 1, and a probability distribution over the two potential partners in step (3) in case the firm
is invited in step (2). Also, a strategy includes an offer to be made to each potential partner in
step (5) in case the firm is chosen by nature in step (4) and an answer to every possible offer
received by either of the two possible partners in step (5). In principle, the "moves" in steps
(3), (5), and (6) may depend on previous moves, in particular on previous moves in that period.
Nevertheless, for simplicity and keeping with the stationarity assumption, we will only consider
equilibria where B’s choice of partner for steps (4) to (6) does not depend on who played the
role of A, and offers and answers in (5) and (6) depend on the identity of E and F , but not on
who played the role of A and B.
In the trivial case that c < c12 ≤ c13 no merger would pass the requirements of the authorities,
and hence there is no room for negotiation. Almost as trivial is the case c12 ≤ c < c13, where
only one merger is feasible. In the unique equilibrium for that case, the efficient merger is
agreed in period 0 and firms 1 and 2 obtain an expected payoff per period π12(c12)2 , whereas firm
3 obtains π3 (c12).
The most interesting case is c12 ≤ c13 ≤ c, where three mergers are feasible. Since all
acceptable mergers are profitable and attractive, a merger is bound to occur immediately with
probability one. However, there is still a question as to the identity of the merger. The following
proposition characterizes the unique equilibrium outcome in this case.
Proposition 1 Suppose all three mergers are feasible. Then, for r sufficiently small, there
exists a unique SPE outcome, both in payoffs and probability distribution over mergers. A
merger always occurs with probability 1 in the first period. However, the identity of the merger
depends on parameter values: (i) If
¡
1
2 + r
¢
π12 − (1 + r)π13 + π3 ≥ 0 then the efficient merger
between firms 1 and 2 occurs with probability one, (ii) if
¡
1
2 + r
¢
π12 − (1 + r)π13 + π3 < 0 then
all three potential mergers take place with positive probability. In particular, the probability of
the efficient merger is:
d =
π12 − 2π1 + 4r (π12 − π13)
−π12 + 4π13 − 2π1 − 4π3
. (1)
Proof. See Appendix.
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The uniqueness result indicates that our bargaining protocol offers very sharp predictions.
Even more important, these predictions include the possibility of inefficient equilibria. If mergers
are sufficiently heterogeneous (case (i)) then the merger between firms 1 and 2 will occur with
probability one. In the limit, as r → 0, the per-period equilibrium payoffs are u1 = u2 = 12π12
and u3 = π3. In the negotiation stages firm 1 offers θ21 = π12− u21+r , and firm 2 accepts; similarly
for firm 1. The existence of alternative feasible mergers is irrelevant (outside option principle):
any offer that firm 3 may accept or any request that it would make, i.e., above π3, would leave at
most π13−π3 < 12π12 for firm 1 or 2, and hence these firms have no incentives to deviate, inviting
to or accepting the invitation from firm 3. However, when mergers are not too heterogeneous
and satisfy π13 − π3 > 12π12, such equilibrium is impossible. Indeed, in the limit when r → 0, if
d = 1 we would still have u1 = u2 = 12π12 and u3 = π3. This time in the negotiation stages firm
1 (or, equivalently, firm 2) would like to negotiate with firm 3. In the actual negotiation, if firm
1 is the proposer in step (4) then it would offer θ31 = π3, which would be accepted, rendering
the deviation profitable. Likewise, firm 3 would gain when being the proposer to firm 1 in step
(4). Thus, in stage (3) firm 1 would have to accept an invitation by firm 3 in a SPE, and firm
3 would have to invite firm 1 in stage (2), which contradicts d = 1.
Note that in this second case the core (of the cooperative game) is empty. When the core is
empty a pure strategy equilibrium cannot exist in our (flexible) protocol. For such pure strategy
equilibrium to exist, the bargaining protocol would have to impose exogenous "restrictions"
on the merger proposals that firms can make in a given period. Indeed, the reasoning in the
previous paragraph depends very little on the details of our particular protocol. All that is
needed for that reasoning is that, if what they envision is that they will merge tomorrow, firms
1 and 2 would rather attempt today a mutually beneficial agreement with firm 3. This of course
would be a contradiction, and so no such equilibrium exists. Therefore, any equilibrium will
necessarily be characterized by bargaining failures.
The question is then, what could be an equilibrium when the core is empty? It is not difficult
to realize that an equilibrium would have to put positive probability on all three potential
mergers, and that firms 1 and 2 will have a symmetric treatment. If that is so, when firm
1 negotiates with 2, it obtains 12π12 per period. If instead firm 1 negotiates with 3, then its
expected payoff per period as r→ 0 is 12 (π13 + u1 − u3). Hence, firm 1 is indifferent if and only
if:
u1 − u3 = π12 − π13. (2)
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In equilibrium u1 and u3 are given by:
u1 =
1
2
1 + d
2
π12 +
1− d
2
π1, (3)
u3 = dπ3 + (1− d)
µ
π13 −
1
2
π12
¶
. (4)
Indeed, if we solve equations (2),(3), and (4) for d we obtain (1) as r → 0.
In this region, d is always between 13 and 1. When all mergers are identical, π12 = π13,
d = 13 . Since d is a continuous function of c12 and c13, then as far as c12 and c13 are not too
different the probability of the efficient merger is strictly lower than one.
Using different protocols, several papers (Inderst and Wey, 2004; Fridolffson and Stennek,
2005a; and Nocke and Whinston, 2011) also predicted that in situations where mergers are
profitable and attractive then a merger occurs immediately with probability one. In Inderst and
Wey (2004), nature chooses one of the firms as the target. The target firm sets a reserve price
and the other firms bid to acquire the target. In Nocke and Whinston (2011), one of the firms is
exogenously designated as the acquirer, which is entitled to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the
target of her choice. Thus, in both cases there are exogenous restrictions on the set of feasible
mergers. In contrast, Fridolffson and Stennek (2005) propose a bargaining game that treats all
firms symmetrically. In their paper, the bargaining protocol imposes certain restrictions on the
probability distribution over the set of feasible mergers, which tend to enhance the bargaining
power of the weakest player. More specifically, in the spirit of Stähl and Rubinstein, they propose
a protocol where in each period a proponent chosen by nature makes an offer to merge and share
the surplus with one of the other two firms. If the respondent rejects the offer then the game
moves to the next period.8 That is, the bargaining protocol sets an upper bound of 23 for d in
any equilibrium without delay. This upper bound has nothing to do with players’ decisions, but
implies that player 3’s payoff is higher than in our game. Moreover, also as a consequence of
this rigidity, the game studied by Fridolffson and Stennek (2005) has multiple equilibria in the
asymmetric case.9 In particular, if firm 1 expects player 2 to accept firm 30s offer, then u1 will
be relatively low and firm 1 will also accept firm 3’s offer (likewise for firm 2). However, if firm
1 expects firm 2 to reject firm 30s offer, then u1 will be relatively higher, which will induce firm
1 to reject firm 3’s offer and generate some delay. Clearly, u1 and u2 are higher in the second
equilibrium.
8 In fact, they frame their game in continuous time and bidding rounds occur at random points in time.
However, they also focus on the limit case that the expected difference between two bidding rounds goes to zero.
This is equivalent to the deterministic version we discuss in the text.
9Details are available upon request.
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Our non-cooperative game asymptotically implements a solution concept for cooperative
games, PSBN (Prediction for Simultaneous Bilateral Negotiations), that we have proposed in
an earlier paper (Burguet and Caminal, 2011). We define PSBN as the generalization of a Nash
Bargaining Solution to simultaneous bargaining negotiations. The underlying assumption is
that all pairs simultaneously bargain à la Nash, and that in each of these negotiations fallback
options are endogenous and determined by (consistent) beliefs about the consequences of failing
to reach an agreement in that particular negotiation. Players are assumed to share the same
beliefs about the probability distribution over the success of different coalitions. In our restricted
model this is equivalent to sharing beliefs about the occurrence of each coalition: the probability
of a coalition between 1 and 2 is equal to d, and the probability of a coalition between 1 and
3, or 2 and 3, is f. Of course, d + 2f = 1. Therefore, if negotiations between players 1 and 3
break down then they will expect that coalition (1, 2) will succeed with (conditional) probability
d
1−f , and coalition (1, 3) with probability
f
1−f . Other than that, the PSBN only imposes a weak
restriction on the set of admissible beliefs: a coalition cannot have positive probability of success
if both players prefer to reach an agreement with the third player, with one of the preferences
being strict.
2.3 The ex-ante optimal merger policy
After characterizing the outcome of the bargaining game we are now ready to discuss the optimal
merger approval rule. If we let ∆ (cij) = CS (cij) − CS0 then the ex-ante expected change in
consumer surplus obtained from a given policy rule, c, can be written as:
W (c) =
Z c
0
Z c
c12
{d (c12, c13)∆ (c12) + [1− d (c12, c13)]∆ (c13)}h (c12, c13) dc13dc12 +
+
Z c
0
Z c0
c
∆ (c12)h (c12, c13) dc13dc12.
We can now compute the effect of a change in c on W :
dW (c)
dc
= −
Z c
0
d (c12, c) [∆ (c12)−∆ (c)]h (c12, c) dc12 +
Z c0
c
∆ (c)h (c, c13) dc13. (5)
If c < cn, then an increase in c causes two effects on the expected consumer surplus. On the one
hand, it expands the area where there is a bargaining failure; that is, the area where there is a
positive probability, 1− d, that one of the relatively inefficient merger succeeds. Put differently,
an increase in c intensifies the competition between the efficient and the less efficient mergers.
This effect is reflected in the first term of (5). On the other hand, it expands the area where
some merger that raises consumer surplus is accepted. This is captured by the second term of
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(5). Figure 2 illustrates these two effects. With respect to the reference case where c = cn, the
expected consumer surplus under a policy c < cn is different in the two shaded areas: A and B.
In area A the efficient merger no longer faces the competition from relatively inefficient mergers
and hence the expected consumer surplus is higher: the probability of success of the efficient
merger jumps from d < 1 to 1. In contrast, in area B the consumer surplus is lower: some
consumer surplus enhancing mergers do not pass the tougher standard. The optimal policy
must balance these two countervailing effects. However, for c close cn, the loss in consumer
surplus suffered when a consumer surplus-enhancing merger is rejected is close to zero, whereas
the expected difference in consumer surplus between a merger with costs c12 and one with costs
c13 does not approach zero. That is, the first term is of first order, while the second is of second
order. Therefore, dWdc (c = cn) < 0 and hence the ex-ante optimal rule involves c < cn.
So far we have considered threshold values such that c ≤ cn. It is quite straightforward
to check that a value of c above cn is dominated by c = cn. In this interval both effects have
the same negative sign: an increase in c intensifies competition between the efficient and the
inefficient merger. Moreover, such an increase expands the acceptance of mergers that imply a
reduction in consumers surplus with respect to the status quo. Summarizing,
Proposition 2 The optimal ex-ante merger policy is more stringent than the ex-post; i.e., c <
cn.
The proposition demonstrates that a commitment to a merger rule which is more stringent
than the optimal ex-post rule increases the expected consumer surplus by reducing the proba-
bility that the efficient merger is threatened by a relatively inefficient one. In other words, it
reduces the negative consequences of failures in the bargaining process that lead to a submis-
sion of a merger proposal. A passive merger policy cannot implement the most efficient market
structure, but a more stringent rule can help in alleviating some of its negative consequences.
The comparative statics of the optimal policy are rather straightforward. The gap between
the ex-post and ex-ante optimal policies, cn−c, is higher as the density over area A increases and
the density over area B decreases. In other words, cn−c is high if: (i) it is likely that the efficient
merger involves significant gains in consumer surplus but only small gains from the relatively
inefficient ones, and (ii) it is unlikely that the efficient merger involves small gains in consumer
surplus while the relatively inefficient ones involve losses. No doubt some market characteristics
also have an influence on the relative size of these two areas. For instance, suppose that we are
dealing with an n-firm industry, n ≥ 3, but only three firms are genuine candidates to participate
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in a two-firm merger. Suppose also that potential synergies associated with these mergers are
identical to those of our model, including the joint probability distribution on (c12, c13). Then,
as n increases the distance between c0 and cn decreases, which implies that area B diminishes,
and as a result cn − c increases.
3 Foundations of the reduced forms
In this section we review some alternative models of competition that satisfy all conditions
(A.1) through (A.4). Consider a differentiated goods model in the spirit of Dixit (1979). The
representative consumer’s utility function is quadratic in the varieties produced by each firm
i = 1, 2, 3, and additively separable in the numeraire good, x. More specifically:
U(q, x) = x+ α
3X
i=1
qi −
β
2
3X
i=1
q2i −
γ
2
3X
i=1
Y
j 6=i
qiqj ,
where qi represents the quantities of variety i consumed, and q = (q1, q2, q3). The inverse
demand function for each good, pi =
∂U(q,x)
∂qi
, is then linear in all quantities, and the consumer
surplus can be written as
dCS(q, x) = U(q, x)− 3X
i=1
piqi = x+
β − γ
2
3X
i=1
q2i +
γ
2
(
3X
i=1
qi)2. (6)
Whether firms compete in quantities or in prices, the reaction function of a stand alone firm
is unchanged by a merger. Thus, if for cij = cn a merger between firm i and j sets output equal
to the pre-merger level q0 for each of its varieties, then the stand alone firm k will also set output
q0, so that prices of all varieties will be unaffected. Thus, πij (cn) = (c0 − cn) 2q0 + 2π0 > 2π0,
and πk (cn) = π0. With quantity competition, a decrease in cij results in a higher quantity
of each of the varieties produced by the merged firms, and a reduction in the output of firm
k. Likewise, with price competition, a decrease in cij results in lower prices both for varieties
produced by the merged firm and the variety produced by firm k, as long as firm k produces a
positive output. However, the (direct) first effect dominates for each firm, so that the output
of the varieties produced by the merged firm is larger and the output of firm k lower after the
reduction. Thus, the profits of the merged firms are decreasing in cij whereas the profits of
firm k are increasing in cij . Once again, the first effect is stronger, so that total profits of the
industry (and total output) are decreasing in cij .
It follows that assumptions (A.2) through (A.4) are satisfied by this model. Finally, for both
terms in the right hand side of (6) to be decreasing in cij it suffices that both the output and
the effect of changes in cij on output are larger for the varieties of the merged firm than for
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the variety of firm k. As already mentioned, these conditions are satisfied when cij < cn, both
under quantity and price competition. Thus, condition (A.1) is also satisfied.
Lemma 3 Whether firms compete in quantities or prices, assumptions (A.1) through (A.4) are
satisfied under appropriate parameter restrictions.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The parameter restrictions (on α, β, γ, and c0) that the lemma refers to are presented in the
proof and are only necessary to ensure that cn > 0, that is, that there exists a possibility that
a merger increases consumer surplus. If this was not the case, then some of the properties in
(A.1) through (A.4) would not be satisfied but our results in the main section would be trivially
satisfied.
When all firms produce homogeneous goods, β = γ, and firms compete in quantities, the
lemma still holds and so the Cournot model with linear demand is a particular case. Moreover,
with homogeneous good it is a simple exercise to show that assumptions (A.1) through (A.4)
are satisfied under much more general conditions. For instance, assume homogeneous products
and a strictly decreasing inverse demand function p(Q) that satisfies p0 (Q)Q+ p” (Q) < 0. As
in the differentiated goods case, and for the same purpose, we also impose conditions so that
cn > 0.
Lemma 4 The Cournot model satisfies assumptions (A.1) through (A.4) under appropriate
restrictions on the primitives.
Proof. See the Appendix
Finally, we discuss to what extent a positive sunk cost of merging may alter the results of the
benchmark model. Let F be the level of sunk costs that leaves firms i and j indifferent between
merging and not merging if cij = cn; i.e., F ≡ πij (cn) − 2π0. The competition models that we
have reviewed here satisfy F > 0. If F ≤ F then all acceptable mergers are still profitable (and
attractive) and hence sunk costs are completely irrelevant. If F > F then some socially desirable
mergers may not be proposed. Moreover, mergers may become non-profitable but attractive;
that is, firms may prefer that no merger takes place, but if they expect that a merger will occur
then they prefer to be part of it rather than being left out. As a result, there may be multiple
equilibria: in one of them no merger takes place and in the others one of the mergers occurs
with positive probability (preemptive mergers).10 An explicit analysis of the policy implications
in this scenario requires an equilibrium selection device and it will not be elaborated here.
10See Fridolfsson and Stenneck (2005a) for an analysis of the symmetric mergers case.
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4 More than three firms
The main predictions of the benchmark model do not depend on the assumption that there
are initially three firms in the market. However, the case of more than three firms opens the
possibility of more than one merger and so adds a potentially dynamic occurrence of mergers.
As a first step in generalizing our analysis in this direction, suppose that the industry is initially
populated by four identical firms: 1, 2, 3, 4. As in the benchmark model let us assume that only
bilateral mergers can generate synergies, and also let us maintain a similar quasi-symmetric
structure: c12 ≤ c13 = c14 = c23 = c24 ≤ c34 = c0. Thus, there are two types of firms.
Firms 1 and 2 are able to generate synergies and the most efficient merger is precisely the one
that involves them both. A merger of either of them with one of the other two generates an
intermediate level of synergies, while the merger between firms 3 and 4 generates no synergies at
all.11 As in the benchmark model, the identity of all firms is common knowledge among firms,
but it is ignored by authorities.
The bargaining game described in Section 2.2 can easily be adapted in the same spirit to the
presence of four players, so that no exogenous restrictions on the probability of each merger are
imposed. In particular, only the selection of negotiation partners (stages (1) to (3) of the stage
game) needs be modified. The new sequence should now read:
(1) Nature selects one of the four firms, each with probability 14 . Let that firm be A.
(2) Firm A invites one of the other three firms to become its negotiation partner. Let us call
it firm B.
(3) Firm B either accepts the offer and then firms (A,B) enter into the negotiation stage,
or it rejects it and chooses an alternative negotiation partner. Hence, either (B,C) or (B,D)
enter into the negotiation stage.
Although only bilateral mergers generate synergies, authorities may still accept two merger
proposals if they both generate sufficient synergies so that a duopoly is socially optimal. Thus,
in general a policy rule may consist of two thresholds, c1, c2, where c2 could be a function of the
marginal cost of the first merger, call it cF , or equivalently, of the post-merger price.12
If two mergers are feasible, we can simply assume that after the first successful merger, the
remaining two firms keep bargaining according to the protocol described in stages (4) to (6) and
continue to do so in every period until an agreement is reached.
11We close this section with a comment on the case c34 < c0; that is, that merger (3, 4) can also generate
synergies.
12 In practice it makes little sense to think of rules that are conditional on the "number of mergers" previously
realized. It would thus be reasonable to restrict to simpler rules that only depend on the effect of the merger on
prices. Such restriction would be irrelevant for our purposes.
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Denote by cn1 and cn2(cF ) the ex-post optimal myopic acceptance rule. That is, cni is the
marginal cost of the ith merger, i = 1, 2, that leaves the market price unchanged. We will
assume that c13 ≤ cn1 if and only if c13 ≤ cn2(cn1). Nocke and Whinston (2010) have shown
that this assumption is satisfied in the Cournot model. It can be shown that it also holds in
the differentiated goods model of Dixit (1979), discussed in the previous section.13 That is, if it
is expected that a mixed merger between either firm 1 or 2 and one of the other firms will be
approved, then the merger between the remaining firms would also be approved. Put differently,
two consecutive mergers with the same level of efficiency are complements from a consumer
surplus point of view.
Let us examine the merger equilibrium if the authority sets c1 = cn1, c2 = cn2(cF ). We need
to consider two alternative scenarios depending on whether one or two mergers are feasible.
First, consider the case that c12 ≤ c13 ≤ cn1 and also assume that if a merger (1, 3) is
approved, then the merger (2, 4) is not profitable.14 In this case there are two types of equilibria
analogous to those described by Proposition 1. Denote by π3 the profits of each of the stand
alone firms when firms 1 and 2 merge. If the following condition holds:
1
2
π12 − π13 + π3 ≥ 0, (7)
then the efficient merger occurs immediately with probability one, in the limiting case of r→ 0.
That is, u1 = u2 = 12π12, and u3 = u4 = π3. This equilibrium requires that firms 1 and 2 prefer
to merge with each other, and firms 3 and 4 are unable to tempt 1 or 2. That is, the equilibrium
payoff of firms 1 and 2, 12π12, should be higher than the maximum payoff any of them can obtain
from deviating and inviting one of the other firms, π13− π3. This is exactly condition (7). This
is one of the types of equilibrium. However, if condition (7) fails then the efficient merger cannot
take place with probability one, and in the unique equilibrium all acceptable mergers will occur
with positive probability, just as in case (ii) of Proposition 1.
Summarizing, when only one merger is feasible, the analysis of the four-firm case is identical
to the three-firms case: if alternative mergers are not too different, then the merger that generates
both lower profits and lower consumer surplus succeeds with positive probability (bargaining
failure). Consequently, an approval rule slightly more stringent than cni would generate second
order losses but first order gains.
Second, let us assume that c12 ≤ c13 ≤ cn1 and the sunk cost of merging F is sufficiently low.
To simplify the presentation set F = 0. Then, from assumption (A.2) all socially acceptable
13We still assume that conditions (A1) to (A4) are satisfied unless otherwise specified.
14 In the Appendix we show that this is the case in the Cournot model with linear demand and fixed costs of
merging for some range of parameter values.
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mergers are also profitable. In this case, there are two competing market structures. On the one
hand, if the merger (1, 2) is proposed first, then the equilibrium structure is a triopoly. On the
other hand, if a mixed merger between either firm 1 or 2 and one of the other firms is proposed
and approved, this will be followed by a merger by the remaining firms. The resulting market
structure will be a duopoly. From a consumer surplus point of view, assume that the merger
between 1 and 2 will be preferred if and only if c13 ≥ bc (c12), where bc (c12) is an increasing
function with bc (cn1) = cn1. In the Cournot model with linear demand bc (c12) = 5cn1+3c128 . In
contrast, the equilibrium of the bargaining game is determined by the total expected profits
under the two market configurations. If 1 and 2 merge then they make π12, and the standing
alone firms make π3 each. After the two symmetric mergers each of the merged firms makes
duopoly profits that we can represent by eπ13. If the following condition holds:
π12 + 2π3 ≥ 2eπ13, (8)
then firms 1 and 2 merge with probability one if r is close to 0. That is, in the limiting case
of r → 0 payoffs are u1 = u2 = 12π12 and u3 = u4 = π3. Firms 1 and 2 are only willing to
merge with each other and never accept an offer from firms 3 or 4. This will occur only if the
maximum gains that firm 1 or 2 can make by deviating, eπ13 − π3, are lower than 12π12. Hence,
an equilibrium of this type exists if and only if condition (8) holds. If condition (8) fails then
as r goes to 0 two symmetric mergers take place with probability one. That is, the final market
structure is a duopoly where each firm is the result of a mixed merger. 15
It is important to note that in this second case, i.e., when two mergers are feasible, there are
no bargaining failures in the private sense. Condition (8) indicates that the resulting market
structure is the one that maximizes total profits. However, social and private objectives do
not coincide. In particular, if c13 is close to cn1, and c12 is not too far away from cn1, then
the merger between firms (1, 2) maximizes consumer surplus (c13 > bc (c12)), but the alternative
market structure will take place in equilibrium. More specifically, if c12 = c13 = cn1 (= cn2(cn1))
then π12 = eπ13. The reason is that all merged firms face the same residual demand and have the
same marginal cost. Moreover, from assumption (A.2) π12 > 2π0 = 2π3. Therefore, condition
(8) does not hold. Thus, this new source of discrepancy between social and private objectives
15The intuition behind this latter equilibrium type requires considering positive discounting. For r > 0, firms
3 and 4 prefer to merge with either 1 or 2, but the latter are indifferent as to the merging partner. Thus, in
equilibrium the merger between firms 1 and 2 occur with probability d, mergers (1, 3) and (2, 4) with probability
1−d
2 , and mergers (1, 4) and (2, 3) with probability
1−d
2 . For firms 1 and 2 to be indifferent it must the case that
π12 − u1 = ?π13 − u3. This equation, together with the determinants of u1 and u2, allows us to compute d (r),
whose limit is zero.Morevoer, firms 3 and 4 will not have incentives to deviate if ?π13−u1 ≥ π3, which in the limit
is equivalent to the failure of (8).
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once again calls for a more stringent merger rule that generates second order losses but first
order gains.
A crucial assumption of our model is that different mergers may generate different levels of
synergies. However, we have explicitly assumed a quasi-symmetric structure: firms 1 and 2 are
symmetric, and so are firms 3 and 4.Moreover, we have ruled out the possibility that firms (3, 4)
may submit an eligible merger proposal. If we relax these two assumptions the model becomes
far more complex, and the dynamic features of merger policy may take a more central role. New
effects may appear. For example, if we let c34 ≤ cn1 and only one merger is possible then, under
some parameter values, it can be shown that in equilibrium firms 1 and 2 prefer to merge with
each other, and as a result firms 3 and 4 also prefer to meet each other. Under our bargaining
protocol the successful merger will be the result of a kind of merger race. Formally, the result
of the race will be determined by nature’s choice in stage (1) of the protocol. Once again, a
more stringent merger policy would also alleviate this type of bargaining failure. If on top of
this we may have c34 ≤ cn2(c12) and more than one merger is possible, then there may be two
alternative duopoly configurations: (1, 2) and (3, 4) on the one hand, and (1, 3) and (2, 4) on
the other (or the other equivalent permutation). Then, cn1 may eliminate mixed mergers and
cn2(cF ) may eliminate merger (3, 4). Whether or not these two instruments are complements or
substitutes may be an issue.
The analysis of the four-firm case suggests that there was hardly anything special about the
three-firm case. Thus, bargaining failures and their implications for merger policy are likely to
be part of the big picture under any initial market structure. However, it also indicates that the
typology of cases grows with the number of firms, as does the complexity associated with the
dynamic aspects. In a truly dynamic merger situation, where not all merger opportunities unfold
simultaneously,16 there are certainly new issues worth exploring but, once again, bargaining
failures of the type described here are bound to be among them.
5 Imperfect cost monitoring
In this section we relax the assumption that authorities can perfectly observe the potential
synergies generated by a merger proposal. Instead, we assume that they have access only to a
noisy signal, whose quality depends on the effort exerted by the partners in the potential merger.
That is, authorities allow for an efficiency defense, but they set the information standards
that are required to substantiate such efficiency claims. Merger policy will then consist of two
16Like in Nocke and Whinston (2010).
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instruments: the minimum quality of the noisy signal and the threshold of its realization. Also,
assume that industries differ in how costly it is to generate any given quality of information,
while the authorities are unable to distinguish between the different types. This second source of
asymmetric information rules out the possibility that the information requirement can perfectly
screen the cost cij and render the actual monitoring process redundant.
Thus, assume that a signal reveals the cost cij with probability b (e). With probability 1−b (e)
the signal takes the value c0 so that it reveals nothing. The value of b is an increasing function of
e, the verifiable effort spent in generating the signal’s quality. In a particular industry, the cost
of effort e is e with probability s and 0 with probability 1 − s. Let b(e) be twice continuously
differentiable, with b0 (e) > 0, b00 (e) < 0, b (M) = 1, for M very large, and b(0) = 0.17 A merger
policy is a pair (e, c): authorities require from firms a minimum level of effort, e, and commit
to accept the merger if and only if the realization of the signal is lower than c.
Assume the industry is one where the effort is costly. If a merger results in cost cij ≤ c and
merging partners exert a costly effort e, then their expected profits upon applying for approval
are18
Πij(cij ; e) = b (e)π(cij) + [1− b (e)] 2π0 − e.
Πij(cij ; e) = 2π0 defines a threshold bc(e), with bc(e) decreasing in e.19 Firms will be willing to
submit their proposal only if cij ≤ min{c,bc(e)}. Also dΠijde < 0, so that there are no incentives
to exert effort above the minimum requirement, e.
If the industry is one where effort is costless, then if cij ≤ c firms would be willing to submit
their proposal and exert effort M so that cij is revealed. If cij > c then we assume that they
will not bother.
If effort is costly, in the region where bargaining failures may occur (Π12 − 2Π13 + 2Π3 < 0)
the probability that the efficient merger is proposed, dc, can be written by simply reinterpreting
equation (1) in the limiting case of r→ 0:
dc (c12, c13; e) =
b (e) (π12 − 2π1)− e
b (e) (−π12 + 4π13 − 2π1 − 4π3)− 3e
,
and ∂dc∂e > 0. That is, a higher effort requirement affects the efficient merger relatively less. As
a result it reduces the probability of a bargaining failure even in those cases where the least
17The specification of the noisy signal allows for type I errors, but type II errors are avoided This simplifies the
analysis significantly.
18The profits of a standing alone firm, Π3 are similarly affected: with probability b they will be π3 and with
probability 1− b it will be π0.
19We are assuming that in equilibrium b will be sufficiently high so all socially desirable mergers are profitable
and attractive. If b is too low in equilibrium, we may have some non profitable mergers that are attractive, just
as in the case discussed at the end of Section 3.
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efficient mergers are still profitable. If firms’ effort is costless then the probability that the
efficient merger is submitted, dnc, does not depend on e, and is given by (1) as r→ 0.
Suppose that bc(e) > c. In that case, whether effort is costly or not, firms will choose to
submit a proposal if and only if cij ≤ c, and then bc(e) will play no role in such a decision.
However, higher e implies higher b (e), which has a positive effect on consumer surplus because
it raises both dc and the fraction of approved mergers. Thus, the optimal policy cannot be
such that bc(e) > c. Hence, we can restrict the analysis to the case bc(e) ≤ c. Then, bc(e) is the
threshold relevant for mergers with costly effort, and c is only relevant for mergers with costless
effort.
This last observation means that, absent bargaining failures, the optimal value of c is cn.
However, when dc, dnc < 1 the derivative of the expected consumer surplus with respect to c
(≤ cn) is simply (5). Hence, the presence of bargaining failures reduces the optimal threshold
value of c, just like in the benchmark model.
The effect of e on consumer surplus, and how this effect is affected by the presence of
bargaining failures is more involved. Let g (c12) and G (c12) be the (marginal) density and
distribution function of c12,20 respectively, and assume away bargaining failures. That is, assume
that the merger between 1 and 2 is the only one proposed. The expected consumer surplus would
then be
W = (1− s) b (e)
Z ?c
0
∆ (c12) dG (c12) + s
Z c
0
∆ (c12) dG (c12) , (9)
and so the derivative of W with respect to e is (1− s) times
b (e)bc0 (e)∆ (bc) g (bc) + b0 (e)Z ?c
0
∆ (c12) dG (c12) .
The second term is positive, since b0 > 0. It represents the effect that e has on the informative-
ness of the signal and then on the proportion of consumer surplus-enhancing mergers that are
approved. The first term is negative, since bc0 < 0. It represents the loss of marginal, consumer
surplus-enhancing mergers that do not apply when the cost of gathering the required information
is higher.
When we take into account the possibility that mergers other than (1, 2) apply, then the
expression of W is more involved. It will be similar to (9), where the second term is still
independent of e. The first term, corresponding to the expected consumer surplus when effort
is costly, will be
(1− s)b(e)
Z ?c
0
Φ(c12,bc)dG (c12)
20That is, g (c12) =
? c0
c12
h (c12, c13) dc13.
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where
Φ(c12,bc) = Z c0
c12
[dc∆ (c12) + (1− dc)∆ (c13)] dH (c13 |c12 ) ,
and dH (c13 |c12 ) is the density of c13 conditional on c12. Note that Φ(c12,bc) depends on bc since
dc does (for instance, dc = 1 whenever c13 > bc). In general, lower bc implies higher dc and since
∆ (c12) > ∆ (c13), then higher Φ(c12,bc). The derivative of W with respect to e is (1− s) times
b (e)bc0 (e)Φ(bc,bc)g (bc) + b0 (e)Z ?c
0
Φ(c12,bc)dG (c12) + b(e)Z ?c
0
bc0 (e) ∂Φ(c12,bc)
∂bc dG (c12) . (10)
The comparison with the optimal value of bc in the absence of bargaining failures is complicated
since Φ(c12,bc) < ∆ (c12). In general, the quality of the proposals is diminished and hence
there is less incentive to monitor them carefully, which makes a higher level of bc (lower e) more
attractive. However, with the new effect directly linked to the effect of e on the probability of
these bargaining failures, the third term in (10) is positive since both bc0 and ∂Φ∂?c are negative.
Thus, this new effect calls for tougher merger policies with respect to e.
Summarizing, under imperfect cost monitoring, bargaining failures still induce authorities
to commit to a lower threshold level of the noisy signal than the ex-post optimal one (a more
stringent policy in this sense), but they may or may not require the signal to be of higher quality.
6 Discussion
In this paper we have made two main points: (a) passive merger policy opens the door to
relatively inefficient mergers because of potential bargaining failures, and (b) a commitment
to a more stringent policy rule may alleviate this inefficiency. These two ideas have first been
illustrated in a stylized model with three ex-ante identical firms, but we have also shown that
some of the reduced forms are compatible with several standard oligopoly models. We have
also suggested that results are likely to hold in the general case where an arbitrary number of
firms are involved in the merging process. Finally, we have examined how to specify point (b) in
the event merger policy includes more than one instrument. However, anticipating how results
could or would change if we modify the model in other directions is more difficult to assert.
Three important issues remain to be briefly discussed. First, if firms are ex-ante asymmetric,
then the policy rule in principle may well depend on the relative position of firms in the status
quo. Second, bargaining failures could be eliminated if firms were allowed to reach binding
agreements that include monetary transfers between the merged and non-merged firms. Third,
competition authorities may care not only about the effect of a merger on consumer surplus,
but may also put some weight on industry profits.
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Let us consider the following change in the previous model. Suppose that firms have different
marginal costs in the triopoly game. Then, the merger rule could be conditioned on the relative
position of firms in the status quo. In a Cournot (homogeneous product) model where an
exogenously designated buyer can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to one of the potential target
firms, Nocke and Whinston (2011) have shown that private and social incentives are misaligned:
mergers that cause a higher increase in the (naively computed) Herfindhal index tend to be more
profitable for similar levels of consumer surplus. As a result, the optimal ex-ante policy rule
includes multiple requirements for mergers that cause varied increases in the Herfindhal index.
For the merger that causes the lowest increase in the Herfindhal index, the optimal ex-ante
policy requires that the merger does not decrease consumer surplus with respect to the status
quo. For the rest of the mergers the optimal policy is more stringent: it requires a minimum
increase in consumer surplus, the size of which is larger as the Herfindhal index increases. In our
model with ex-ante symmetric firms, private and social incentives are perfectly aligned as far as
the choice of the merger is concerned: the merger that maximizes consumer surplus is also the
one that maximizes aggregate profits. Thus, in our setting a commitment to a more stringent
merger policy is desirable, exclusively due to failures in the bargaining process. The insights
from Nocke and Whinston (2011) and ours are potentially complementary. However, it is not
obvious how ex-ante asymmetries and bargaining failures may interact, and hence what would be
the consequences of both factors combined in the implementation of the optimal merger policy.
This issue is left for future research.
One of the crucial characteristics of our bargaining protocol is that only bilateral agreements
are feasible. In our framework whenever a merger involves lower consumer surplus then it also
implies lower industry profits. Thus, bargaining failures are mainly associated with the inability
of the merging partners to compensate the outsider. Alternatively, if firms could sign binding
contracts involving potential transfers from the merged to non-merged firms then we would
expect that the probability of a relatively inefficient merger would be substantially diminished.
Obviously, allowing for transfer payments among firms is a delicate issue, as it could be used
to implement collusive arrangements. Allowing transfer payments may also be counterproductive
if there exists the possibility of preemptive mergers, which were discussed at the end of Section
3. In this case, since a merger lowers aggregate profits but raises consumer surplus, if and when
transfer payments are allowed then firms may be able to reach an overall agreement that destroys
the merger equilibrium.21
21Fridolfsson and Steneck (2005b) have noticed that divesture clauses in merger proposals can actually be
equivalent to transfer payments between merged and non-merged firms. They have shown that when mergers
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Let us now consider the case where competition authorities maximize a weighted average
of consumer surplus and profits. Extending the analysis in this direction involves considering
mergers that are profitable but unattractive, in the sense that firms prefer not to participate
and be left out of the merger. In this case, Fridolfsson and Stennek (2005a and 2005b) show
that the bargaining game is a war of attrition, and if all mergers are symmetric then there are
multiple equilibria. In particular, there is an equilibrium where a merger takes place later in the
game (delay). In our model with asymmetric mergers it can be shown that for some parameter
values there is a probability that the relatively inefficient merger succeeds. Hence the identity
problem is also an issue in this scenario. Consequently, the main insight of our paper seems to
extend quite easily to the case where authorities have a more general objective function.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Lemma 3
We are restricting attention to parameter values that imply cn > 0. Thus, we let (3β+2γ)c0 > γα
if competition is in quantities, and γ(β − γ)α < (β + γ)(2β − γ)c0 if competition is in prices.
Also, in order to simplify the discussion we will only consider cases where qk > 0. This requires
that βα > (β+ γ)c0 if competition is in quantities and (β−γ)α > (β− γ
2
β+γ )c0,
22 if competition
is in prices.
The inverse demand function for each good is
pi =
∂U(q, x)
∂qi
= α− βqi − γ
X
j 6=i
qj , (11)
where pi is the price of variety i in terms of the numeraire. Thus, the consumer surplus as a
function of (q, x) can be written as
dCS(q, x) = U(q, x)− 3X
i=1
piqi = x+
β − γ
2
3X
i=1
q2i +
γ
2
(
3X
i=1
qi)2.
Quantity competition: In the triopoly game each firm solves
max
qi
⎛
⎝α− c0 − βqi − γ
X
j 6=i
qj
⎞
⎠ qi,
with reaction function
qi = R0(q−i) =
α− c0 − γ
P
j 6=i qj
2β
. (12)
22 In price competition, if the intercept of the demand for firm k is below c0, then the equilibrium price for firm
k is c0.
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Then the symmetric equilibrium output of each firm, q0, is
q0 =
α− c0
2(β + γ)
. (13)
Assume firms i and j merge with cost of each variety cij . Firm k’s reaction function is still
(12). For the merged firm the first order condition that determines qi is now
(α− cij − 2βqi − 2γqj − γqk = 0, (14)
and similarly for qj . In equilibrium, qi = qj . Thus, let qij(cij) denote this common quantity of
varieties i and j, and qk(cij) denote the equilibrium quantity for firm k. These values are
qij(cij) =
2β (α− cij)− γ(α− c0)
4β(β + γ)− 2γ2 , (15)
qk(cij) =
2(γ + β)(α− c0)− 2γ (α− cij)
4β(β + γ)− 2γ2 .
We assume that indeed the condition for interior solution is satisfied. We let cn be the value of
cij that satisfies qij(cij) = q0, where q0 is the solution under triopoly defined in (13). We will
see below that this value is well defined and below c0. Since the reaction function of firm k has
not changed, then also qk(cn) = q0. Finally, CS(cn) = CS0.
Price competition: Assume now that firms set prices. We still have that the inverse demand
system is given by (11). Inverting that system, we obtain the demand system,
qi =
1
D
[α(β − γ)− (β + γ)pi + γ(pj + pk)] ,
where D = (β − γ)(β + 2γ). We write this as
qi =
1
D
[A−Bpi +G(pj + pk)] ,
where A = α(β − γ), B = (β + γ) and G = γ. The first order condition for profit maximization
by firm i is
A+Bc0 − 2Bpi +G(pj + pk) = 0. (16)
Solving this system we obtain the pre-merger equilibrium prices as
p0 =
A+Bc0
2(B −G) .
Assume firms i and j merge. Firm k’s first order condition is still (16), whereas for the merged
firm in its variety i the first order condition is
A+ (B −G)cij − (2B −G)pi +G(pj + pk) = 0.
Solving this system for pi = pj , we obtain
pij =
A(G+ 2B) + 2B(B −G)cij +BGc0
4B(B −G)− 2G2 ,
pk =
AB +B(B −G)c0 +G(B −G)cij
2B(B −G)−G2 .
The quantities are
qij =
1
D
[A− (B −G)pij +Gpk] ,
qk =
1
D
[A− 2Bpk + 2Gpij ] .
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Note that,
dqij
dcij
=
2(B −G)
D (4B(B −G)− 2G2)
¡
−(B −G)B +G2
¢
< 0,
since (B −G) = β > γ = G and B = β + γ > G. Likewise,
dqk
dcij
=
2G(B −G)B
D (4B(B −G)− 2G2) > 0.
Moreover,
2
dqij
dcij
+
dqk
dcij
< 0,
since 2
¡
−(B −G)B +G2
¢
+ GB = −2B2 + 3GB + 2G2 = −2(β + γ)2 + 3(β + γ)γ + 2γ2 =
−2β2 − βγ + 3γ2, which is negative. Thus an increase in cij reduces the total quantity sold in
the market, adding up all varieties.
Let cn be such that pk(cn) = p0. Note again that pij(cn) = p0. Indeed, the reaction function
of firm k has not changed, so that any other prices by the merged firms would imply a different
price by firm k.
We now show that all assumptions (A.1) through (A.4) are satisfied, both with price and
quantity competition.
(A.4): πij + πk is decreasing in cij :
Assume quantity competition. Then, using the first order conditions of the firms’ maximiza-
tion problems,
d(πij + πk)
dcij
= −2qij + 2
∂qij
∂cij
∂pk
∂qij
qk +
∂qk
∂cij
∂pij
∂qk
qij
= −2qij + 2
2β
D
γqk −
2γ
D
γqij ,
where D = 4β(β + γ)− 2γ2. Thus, the sign is the same as the sign of
−4β(β + γ)qij + βγqk < 0.
Alternatively, assume price competition. Then, taking into account the first order conditions of
firms’ maximization problems for price competition,
d(πij + πk)
dcij
= −2qij + 2
∂qij
∂pk
∂pk
∂cij
(pij − cij) +
∂qk
∂pij
∂pij
∂cij
(pk − c0)
= −2qij + 2
G
D
∙
∂pk
∂cij
(pij − cij) +
∂pij
∂cij
(pk − c0)
¸
=
−2 1
D
[A− (B −G)pij +Gpk] + 2
G
D
∙
∂pk
∂cij
(pij − cij) +
∂pij
∂cij
(pk − c0)
¸
.
The second square bracket is positive. For interior solutions qk > 0, so that A−2Bpk+2Gpij > 0,
and then the first square bracket is larger than (2B+G)pk−(G+B)pij . Note that ∂pk∂cij ,
∂pij
∂cij
< 1,
(pk − c0) < pk and (pij − cij) < pij . Thus, the expression is smaller than 2 1D times
− [(2B +G)pk − (G+B)pij ] +G [pij + pk]
= −2Bpk + (2G+B)pij
= −2(β + γ)pk + (3γ + β)pij < 0,
where the last inequality follows from β > γ and the fact that, since ∂pk∂cij <
∂pij
∂cij
, then for
cij < cn, pk > pij . Q.E.D.
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(A.2) and (A.3): dπijdcij < 0 and
dπk
dcij
> 0:
Under quantity competition the proof is trivial, since qk is increasing in cij and qij is de-
creasing in cij . Also, for price competition
dπk (cij)
dcij
=
∂qk
∂pij
∂pk
∂cij
(pk − ck) > 0,
and that, together with the previous lemma, proves that dπijdcij < 0. Q.E.D.
Note that, if cn is well defined, then πij (cn) = (p0 − cn) 2q0 > 2 (p0 − c0) q0 = 2π0, and
πk (cn) = (p0 − c0) q0 = π0. Thus, (A.2) indeed follows from the lemma when cn is well defined.
We now turn to (A.1).
(A.1): CS(cij) is a differentiable, decreasing function of cij for cij < c0, and so cn is well
defined, where CS(cn) = CS0:
Assume quantity competition. Note that by (15) dqij(cij)dcij < 0. Thus an increase in cij
will induce a reduction in qij(cij). Then it suffices to show that dCS((qij , qij , R0(qij)) , x) is
differentiable and increasing in qij for the relevant domain, cij ≤ c0. And indeed,
dCS((qij , qij , R0(qij)) , x)
dqij
= (17)
(β − γ)(2qij +R00qk) + γ(2 +R00)(2qij + qk),
where R00 is the slope of the reaction function of firm k. The second term is positive, since
R00 > −1. Also, for cij = c0
2qij +R00qk = (α− c0)
2(2β − γ) + 2(β − γ)R00
4β(β + γ)− 2γ2 ,
and since R00 > −1, this is positive. Finally, 2qij + R00qk is decreasing in cij since
dqij(cij)
dcij
< 0
and dqk(cij)dcij > 0. Thus, for cij < c0 the expression is also positive, and we conclude that (17) is
positive for all cij ≤ c0, which proves the result.
Consider now price competition. Recall thatdCS(q(cij), x) = x+ β−γ2 P3i=1 q2i + γ2 (P3i=1 qi)2.
We have already shown that
P3
i=1 qi is decreasing in cij . Now,
d
P3
i=1 q
2
i
dcij
= (4qij
∂qij
∂cij
+ 2qk
∂qk
∂cij
).
For cij ≤ cn, qij > qk so that since 2dqijdcij +
dqk
dcij
< 0, this term is negative. Now, for all cij > cn,
we have qk > qij . Also, we can write dCS(q(cij), x) = β2 (P3i=1 qi)2− β−γ2 (2q2ij + 4qijqk). Note
that
d(2q2ij + 4qijqk)
dcij
= 4(qij + qk)
∂qij
∂cij
+ 4qij
∂qk
∂cij
> 4(qij + qk)
∂qij
∂cij
+ 4
qij + qk
2
∂qk
∂cij
= 2(qij + qk)
µ
2
∂qij
∂cij
+
∂qk
∂cij
¶
,
where we have used the fact that qk > qij in the inequality. Moreover, note that
d
dcij
(
3X
i=1
qi)2 = 2(2qij + qk)
µ
2
∂qij
∂cij
+
∂qk
∂cij
¶
.
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Therefore,
dCS
dcij
=
β
2
d
dcij
(
3X
i=1
qi)2 −
β − γ
2
d(2q2ij + 4qijqk)
dcij
<
γ
2
d
dcij
(
3X
i=1
qi)2 +
β − γ
2
2qij
µ
2
∂qij
∂cij
+
∂qk
∂cij
¶
< 0,
since 2∂qij∂cij +
∂qk
∂cij
< 0. Q.E.D.
8.2 Proof of Lemma 4
Let p(Q) be twice continuously differentiable, and for all Q such that p(Q) > 0, satisfy (i)
p0 (Q) < 0, (ii) p0(Q) + p00 (Q)Q < 0, and (iii) limQ→∞ p (Q) = 0. Condition (ii) implies that
individual profit functions are strictly concave. The first order condition for firm i’s profit
maximization problem, whether in duopoly or triopoly, is
p0 (Q) qi + p (Q)− ci = 0. (18)
Also, condition (ii) plus constant marginal costs imply that the reaction function of a firm
is decreasing in the output of rival firms with slope greater than −1. Finally, in the duopoly
game, a higher value of cij results in lower qij , and hence higher qk and lower aggregate output.
(See, for instance, Proposition 2.4 in Corchón, 1996.) Thus, CS is decreasing in cij .
If the condition
p0 (Q0) 2q0 + p (Q0) > 0 (19)
holds then in the duopoly game a merged firm with marginal costs cij = 0 will choose a level
of output higher than 2q0, which implies that aggregate output will be higher than Q0 ≡ 3q0.
Therefore, by the monotonicity of CS (cij), cn > 0. It can be shown that condition (19) is equiv-
alent to the elasticity of demand at Q0 being higher than 23 . A sufficient assumption involving
only the primitives that implies (19) is that p (0)− c0 is positive but sufficiently small.
Equilibrium output, consumer surplus and profits are continuously differentiable, since de-
mand is continuously differentiable. At a cost cij = c0, the left hand side of (18) evaluated at
Q = Q0 and qij = 23Q0 (>
1
3Q0) is negative, since p
0 < 0. Thus, at that cost qij < 23Q0, and so
Q1 < Q0. Therefore, CS(c0) < CS0 and cn < c0. Assumption (A.1) holds.
Since qij is decreasing in cij , and qk is increasing in qij , then πij (cij) is decreasing in cij . At
cost cn, qij = 2qk = 23Q0, and since cn < c0, πij (cn) > 2π0. Assumption (A.2) holds.
Similarly, πk (cij) is increasing in cij , and πk (cn) = π0. Assumption (A.3) holds.
Now, using the envelope theorem, we can write
dπij + πk
dcij
= −qij + p0
dqij
dcij
∙
qij
dqk
dqij
+ qk
¸
= qij(−1 + p0
dqij
dcij
∙
dqk
dqij
+
qk
qij
¸
,
where, as mentioned, dqkdqij < 0, and
dqij
dcij
< 0. Thus,dπij+πkdcij < qij(−1 + p
0 dqij
dcij
qk
qij
). Note that
qk
qij
< 1 and, totally differentiating in (18) for the merged firm,
dqij
dcij
=
1
2p0 + p00qij
.
Thus, if p00 < 0, then p0 dqijdcij <
1
2 and
dπij+πk
dcij
< 0. If p00 > 0, then 2p0 + p00qij < 2p0 + p00Q1 < p0,
since we are assuming that p0+p00Q1 < 0. Therefore, p0
dqij
dcij
< 1, and we conclude that dπij+πkdcij <
0. Assumption (A.4) holds.
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8.3 Proof of Proposition 1
A strategy for firm i consists of
³
μji , λ
j
i , λ
k
i
´
for the selection of negotiating partners and³
θji , ρ
j
i , θ
k
i , ρki
´
for the actual negotiation phase. μji is the probability that firm i invites firm j to
be its negotiation partner in node (2), if i is chosen by nature in node (1). Given the definition
of the game, the probability that i proposes k is μki = 1− μ
j
i . λ
j
i is the probability that firm i
accepts firm j’s invitation to become a negotiation partner in node (3), and λki is the probability
that i accepts firm k’s invitation. In line with the restriction to stationary strategies, we will
assume that λji = 1− λki . That is, if invited in step (2), firm i chooses its partner for the nego-
tiation phase independently of who gave it that possibility, firm k or firm j. Therefore, in case
nature chooses firm i, the probability that firms (i, j) negotiate in nodes (5) and (6) is μjiλ
i
j , the
probability that (i, k) negotiate is μki λ
i
k =
³
1− μji
´
λik, and the probability that (j, k) negotiate
is μjiλ
k
j + μki λ
j
k = μ
j
i
¡
1− λij
¢
+
³
1− μji
´ ¡
1− λik
¢
. Also, θji is the (per period) offer that firm
i makes to firm j with probability ρji in node (5) if the former is chosen by nature in node (4)
as the proponent. θki and ρki are the corresponding values in a negotiation with k. In order to
avoid open-set technical problems, and also to save in notation, we assume that in node (6) the
respondent accepts with probability one any offer above or equal to the value of continuation.
That is why we do not include these decisions in the definition of a strategy. As we will see in
the analysis below, this is innocuous and in particular does not rule out the possibility of delay
in case of indifference.23 Then, in any equilibrium θji =
rπ0+uj
1+r whenever πij >
ui+uj+2rπ0
1+r ( and
we can also restrict to such offer when πij =
ui+uj+2rπ0
1+r and ρ
j
i > 0).
Again, note that in line with the restriction to stationary strategies, we are implicitly as-
suming that the answer to invitations to negotiate in node (3) and the offer in node (5) do not
depend on who made the invitation to negotiate or who answered to that invitation, but only
on the identity of the partner.
Let us denote uiji the equilibrium per-period payoff that firm i expects in step (4) before
nature chooses who will make an offer, and given that firms (i.j) will be negotiating. That is, in
any node of the extensive form game reached immediately after i has chosen j as the negotiation
partner, or j has chosen i. Finally, let us dij denote the probability that merger (i, j) succeeds.
We derive several properties of any equilibrium outcome.
8.3.1 Property 1: At least in one negotiation there is a strictly positive surplus;
i.e., there exist a pair (i, j) such that πij >
ui+uj+2rπ0
1+r .
Suppose not; i.e., for all (i, j)
πij ≤
ui + uj + 2rπ0
1 + r
, (20)
which implies that whenever firm i is one of the negotiation partners it gets ui+rπ01+r , whether
the merger materializes or not. If djk = 0 then ui = ui+rπ01+r , so that ui = π0. Thus, (20)
implies that uj > πij and uk > πik. This, together with djk = 0, is a contradiction. If
dij > 0 then ui = djkπi + (1− djk) ui+rπ01+r . Hence, ui ≤ π0. Similarly, uj ≤ π0. Therefore,
ui+uj+2rπ0
1+r ≤ 2π0 < πij . We have reached a contradiction.¤
23 Indeed, apart from open-set issues, in a SPE there could be indifference between accepting and rejecting a
partner’s offer only if the sum of the continuation values for both partners is equal to what they have to share. In
ths case, the fact that the proponent can choose any value ρ in [0, 1] already allows for any probability of delay.
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8.3.2 Property 2: It cannot be the case that there is a strictly positive surplus in
exactly two negotiations .
Suppose that in two and only two negotiations there is a strictly positive surplus, i.e.,
ui + uj + 2rπ0
1 + r
≥ πij ,
ui + uk + 2rπ0
1 + r
< πik,
uj + uk + 2rπ0
1 + r
< πjk.
These inequalities imply that:
uk + rπ0 <
1 + r
2
(πik + πjk − πij) . (21)
Since uiki >
ui+rπ0
1+r = u
ij
i then λ
k
i = (ρki =)1. Similarly, λ
k
j = 1. As a result, dij = 0 and
dik + djk = 1. Hence, we can write:
ui = dik
1
2
µ
πik +
ui − uk
1 + r
¶
+ (1− dik)πi,
uj = dikπj + (1− dik)
1
2
µ
πjk +
uj − uk
1 + r
¶
,
uk = dik
1
2
µ
πik +
uk − ui
1 + r
¶
+ (1− dik)
1
2
µ
πjk +
uk − uj
1 + r
¶
.
If we solve the system for uk then it turns out that for any dik ∈ [0, 1], the solution violates
inequality (21). We have reached a contradiction.¤
8.3.3 Property 3: If firm i strictly prefers to negotiate with firm j and viceversa,
then i = 1 and j = 2.
Consider first the case where there is only one negotiation with a strictly positive surplus. Then
we show that it has to be the negotiation between firms i and j. Indeed, if πij >
ui+uj+2rπ0
1+r ,
then
uiji =
1
2
µ
πij +
ui + rπ0
1 + r
− uj + rπ0
1 + r
¶
>
ui + rπ0
1 + r
,
whereas uiki =
ui+rπ0
1+r . The same applies to j, so that in equilibrium λ
j
i = λ
i
j = 1. Also, this
implies that μji = μ
i
j = 1, and then ui = uj =
1
2πij . Thus, πik ≤
ui+uk+2rπ0
1+r =
πij+2rπ0
1+r only if
(i, j) = (1, 2).
Alternatively, if all three negotiations involve a strictly positive surplus, then suppose that
(i, j) = (1, 3). That is,
u131 > u
12
1 ,
u133 > u
23
3 .
These inequalities imply that λ13 = λ
3
1 = (ρ31 = ρ
1
3 =)1, and also μ
1
3 = μ
3
1 = 1. Thus, u1 = u3 =
1
2π13, and u2 = π2. Then
u121 =
1
2
Ã
π12 +
1
2π13 + rπ0
1 + r
− π2 + rπ0
1 + r
!
>
1
2
Ã
π13 +
1
2π13 + rπ0
1 + r
−
1
2π13 + rπ0
1 + r
!
= u131 ,
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which is a contradiction. A similar contradiction would obtain if we assume that (i, j) = (2, 3).¤
8.3.4 Property 4: Preference cycles cannot occur: If i weakly prefers to negotiate
with j, j weakly prefers to negotiate with k, and k weakly prefers to negotiate
with i, then they all must be indifferent.
Suppose not. If there is a strictly positive surplus in all three negotiations, so that all end up in
agreement, then ui + uj + 2rπ0 ≤ (1 + r)πij , for all i, j, and then
πij −
uj + rπ0
1 + r
≥ πik −
uk + rπ0
1 + r
, (22)
πjk −
uk + rπ0
1 + r
≥ πij −
ui + rπ0
1 + r
, (23)
πik −
ui + rπ0
1 + r
≥ πjk −
uj + rπ0
1 + r
. (24)
If we add up these three inequalities then this can only be satisfied if the three hold with
equality. Suppose instead that only a negotiation between firms 1 and 2 generate a strictly
positive surplus, u1 + u2 + 2rπ0 < (1 + r)π12, but for the rest of the pairs the inequality is
(weakly) reversed. Let i = 1 and j = 2. Then u232 =
u2+rπ0
1+r and for 2 to prefer negotiations with
k = 3, but u2+rπ01+r ≥ π12 −
u1+rπ0
1+r , which contradicts u1 + u2 + 2rπ0 < (1 + r)π12. Similarly if
i = 2 and j = 1.¤
8.3.5 Property 5: If firm 1 strictly prefers to negotiate with firm 2, and viceversa,
then d12 = 1.
If u121 > u
13
1 then λ
2
1 = 1. Similarly, if u122 > u
23
2 then λ
1
2 = 1. Since u131 ≥ u1+rπ01+r and
u232 ≥ u2+rπ01+r , then π12 = u121 + u122 >
u1+u2+2rπ0
1+r . That is, ρ
2
1 = ρ
1
2 = 1. Finally, if μ
3
i > 0,
i = 1, 2, then with positive probability there will be a meeting between firm 3 and either 1 or 2.
Conditional on this, i’s payoff is either ui3i ,
ui+rπ0
1+r , or π2. Since u
12
i > u
i3
i ≥ ui+rπ01+r , this cannot
be part of an equilibrium unless u12i = π2 < π0. Thus, u
12
i = π2 >
ui+rπ0
1+r implies that ui < π2,
which is a contradictions, since π2 can be guaranteed by firms 1 and 2 by simply refusing any
deal. Thus, μ12i = 1 for i = 1, 2, and so d12 = 1.¤
8.3.6 Property 6: Firms 1 and 2 obtain the same expected payoff
Without loss of generality suppose u1 > u2. First, suppose that the negotiation between 1 and
2 is the only one that generates a strictly positive surplus. In this case, u121 >
u1+rπ0
1+r = u
13
1 and
u122 >
u2+rπ0
1+r = u
23
2 , and from Property 5, d12 = 1, which implies u1 = u2 =
1
2π12. Contradiction.
Suppose now that all three negotiations generate a strictly positive surplus. In this case firm
3 strictly prefers to negotiate with firm 2 rather than firm 1: u233 > u
13
3 . Then from Property 4
there are two possibilities; (a) u232 > u
12
2 , and (b) u
12
1 > u
13
1 and u
23
2 ≤ u122 . Case (a) is ruled out
by Property 3. In case (b), note that u121 > u
13
1 implies that λ
2
1 = 1, and u233 > u
13
3 implies that
λ23 = 1. Hence, d13 = 0 and d12 + d23 = 1. Thus,
u1 = d12u121 + d23π1 ≤ u121 , (25)
u2 = d12u122 + d23u
23
3 . (26)
If u232 < u
12
2 then from Property 5, d12 = 1, and equations (25) and (26) imply that u1 = u2. If
u232 = u
12
2 then u2 = u
12
2 , which together with inequality (25) contradicts that u1 > u2.¤
33
8.3.7 Property 7: There are two possible types of equilibria: (I) u121 > u
13
1 and
u122 > u
23
2 , (II) u
ij
i = u
ik
i for all i, j, k.
Since u1 = u2 (Property 6) then u233 = u
13
3 . Thus, both u
12
2 ≤ u232 , u121 ≥ u131 , and u122 ≥ u232 ,
u121 ≤ u131 would violate Property 4, unless both inequalities hold with equality. Thus, besides
the case where all firms are indifferent, there are two other cases to consider: (a) u122 < u
23
2 ,
u121 < u
13
1 and (b) u
12
2 > u
23
2 , u
12
1 > u
13
1 . Case (a) cannot be part of an equilibrium, since in
this case λ21 = λ
1
2 = 0 and hence d12 = 0. Moreover, π13 >
u1+u3+2rπ0
1+r , and π23 >
u2+u3+2rπ0
1+r .
Therefore, d13 + d23 = 1. In this case:
u1 = d13
1
2
µ
π13 −
u3 − u1
1 + r
¶
+ d23π1,
u2 = d13π1 + d23
1
2
µ
π13 −
u3 − u2
1 + r
¶
,
u3 =
1
2
µ
π13 −
u1 − u3
1 + r
¶
.
Since u1 = u2 then d13 = d23. If we solve the above system we find that u3 =
(1+2r)π13−π1
1+4r >
π13
2 .
As a result u131 <
π13
2 <
π12
2 = u
12
1 . We have reached a contradiction.¤
We can now proceed to characterize the two types of equilibria.
8.3.8 Equilibrium type I
Consider an equilibrium with u121 > u
13
1 and u
12
2 > u
23
2 . From Property 4, d12 = 1. For instance,
λ21 = λ
1
2 = μ21 = μ
1
2 = ρ
2
1 = ρ
1
2 = 1. Hence
u1 = u2 =
1
2
π12,
u3 = π3.
Thus, a profitable deviation for either firm 1 or firm 2 exists if and only if 12π12 <
1
2
³
π13 − π31+r +
1
2(1+r)π12
´
.
Therefore, d12 = 1 is an equilibrium if and only if:µ
1
2
+ r
¶
π12 − (1 + r)π13 + π3 ≥ 0.
8.3.9 Equilibrium type II
Consider an equilibrium with uiji = u
ik
i for all i, j, k. If u
ij
i = u
ik
i =
ui+rπ0
1+r , that implies
uijj =
uj+rπ0
1+r and u
ik
k =
uk+rπ0
1+r . Then, since u
ik
k = u
jk
k and u
ij
j = u
jk
j , we reach a contradiction
with Property 1. Thus, uiji = u
ik
i >
ui+rπ0
1+r , so that by Property 3 there is positive surplus in all
negotiations. Thus, all three negotiations would end in agreement. Thus, d12 + d13 + d23 = 1
and
u1 = (d12 + d13)
1
2
π12 + d23π1,
u2 = (d12 + d23)
1
2
π12 + d13π1,
u3 = d12π3 + (d13 + d23)
µ
π13 −
1
2
π12
¶
.
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Since u1 = u2 then d13 = d23. If we let d12 = d, and hence d13 = d23 = 1−d2 , and since
π12 −
u3 + rπ0
1 + r
= π13 −
u1 + rπ0
1 + r
, (27)
we can solve this system to obtain
d =
π12 − 2π1 + 4r (π12 − π13)
−π12 + 4π13 − 2π1 − 4π3
.
Note that (13 ≤) d < 1 if and only if
¡
1
2 + r
¢
π12−(1 + r)π13+π3 < 0. One such equilibrium would
be λji =
1
2 ,for all i, j, and μ
2
1 = μ
1
2 =
3d−1
2 and μ
1
3 =
1
2 . Finally, if
¡
1
2 + r
¢
π12−(1 + r)π13+π3 ≥ 0
then for r sufficiently small u1+u3+2π01+r >
1
2π13, and firms 1 and 2 cannot be indifferent between
negotiating with each other or with firm 3.
Summarizing, for any r sufficiently close to 0 the equilibrium exists and the equilibrium
outcome is unique. Q.E.D.
8.4 More than three firms
Consider the Cournot model with linear demand. In particular, the inverse demand function is
p = 1 −Q, where Q is aggregate output. Thus, if we let n be the number of competing firms,
and provided all firms are active, the equilibrium price can be written as:
p(n) =
1 +
Pn
i=1 ci
n+ 1
,
where ci is the marginal cost of firm i, i = 1, ..., n.
Let us first consider the ex-post optimal myopic acceptance rule. That is, the rule that
maximizes consumer surplus taking into account only the effect of the current merger proposal.
Compared to the status quo, the marginal cost of the first approved merger proposal, cF , must
be lower than cn1, which is given by:
1 + 4c0
5
=
1 + 2c0 + cn1
4
,
i.e.,
cn1 =
6c0 − 1
5
.
Thus, we assume that c0 ∈
£
1
6 ,
1
2
¤
in order to guarantee that there is room for socially efficient
mergers and all firms are active for any realization of synergies. Let us characterize the set of
parameter values such that there is only one merger, but the identity of the merger remains an
issue: c13 ≤ cn1.
A first mixed merger is profitable if and only if:
π13 − 2π0 =
(1 + 2c0 − 3c13)2
16
− (1− 2c0 + c13)
2
8
≥ F. (28)
Similarly, a second mixed merger is not profitable if and only if:
eπ13 − 2π2 = (1− c13)2
9
− (1− 2c0 + c13)
2
4
≤ F. (29)
It is easy to check that for all c0 ∈ [16 ,
1
2 ], and all c13 ∈ [0, cn1], there exists a non-empty interval
of values of F that satisfy both (28) and (29). Thus, in equilibrium there is a single merger, but
the identity of the merger depends on independent conditions on (c12, c13) , as discussed in the
main text.
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